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Existing studies have generally measured collective efficacy by combining survey re-
spondents’ ratings of their local area into an overall summary for each neighborhood.
Naturally, this approach results in a substantive focus on the variation in average levels
of collective efficacy between neighborhoods. In this article, we focus on the variation
in consensus of collective efficacy judgments. To account for differential consensus
among neighborhoods, we use a mixed-effects location-scale model, with variability
in the consensus of judgments treated as an additional neighborhood-level random ef-
fect. Our results show that neighborhoods in London differ, not just in their average
levels of collective efficacy but also in the extent to which residents agree with one an-
other in their assessments. In accord with findings for U.S. cities, our results show that
consensus in collective efficacy assessments is affected by the ethnic composition of
neighborhoods. Additionally, we show that heterogeneity in collective efficacy assess-
ments is consequential, with higher levels of criminal victimization, worry about crime,
and risk avoidance behavior in areas where collective efficacy consensus is low.
Compelling evidence now exists that collective efficacy plays an important role in shap-
ing the patterning of crime, disorder, and perceptions of victimization risk across lo-
cal areas. Collective efficacy is conceived of as a confluence of networks, values, and
norms of reciprocity that combine to enable individuals and communities to intervene
as a way of suppressing norm-deviant behavior and of maintaining social order. Or, as
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Sampson put it, collective efficacy is “the process of activating or converting social ties
among neighborhood residents in order to achieve collective goals, such as public or-
der or control of crime” (2010: 802). Research findings across a range of contexts have
shown that areas characterized by higher collective efficacy have lower levels of crime
(e.g., Armstrong, Katz, and Schnelby, 2015; Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010;
Oberwittler, 2007; Odgers et al., 2009; Sampson, 2012; Sampson and Wikstro¨m, 2007;
Zhang, Messner, and Liu, 2007) and lower levels of fear of victimization and perceived
disorder (e.g., Brunton-Smith, Sutherland, and Jackson, 2014; Farrall, Jackson, and Gray,
2009; Sampson, 2009). It has been posited as the social-psychological mechanism through
which structural characteristics of local areas influence crime-related outcomes, me-
diating associations between neighborhood socioeconomic disadvantage and recorded
and perceived crime rates (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, 2012;
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). Collective efficacy also seems to be important
for understanding a range of other neighborhood-contingent social phenomena, including
risky sexual behavior among teenagers (Browning et al., 2008), adolescent mental health
(Browning et al., 2013), and confidence in the police (Nix et al., 2015).
Collective efficacy (henceforth CE) is considered to be an attribute of neighborhoods
rather than of individuals: a combination of the networks, norms, and trust between resi-
dents and the capacity this endows themwith to control and suppress anti-social and crim-
inal behavior (Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Sampson, 2012; Zhang, Messner,
and Liu, 2007). The collective and inherently subjective nature of the CE concept poses
challenges for valid and robust measurement (Hipp, 2016). In existing empirical stud-
ies, scholars have predominantly approached these measurement challenges by eschew-
ing “objective” indicators and, instead, have combined the subjective ratings of survey
respondents into summary indicators (Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999). This has been
done either by simple averaging (e.g., Bruinsma et al., 2013; Wells et al., 2006; Zhang,
Messner, and Liu, 2007) or by using statistical modeling approaches that adjust for com-
positional differences between individuals and areas (e.g., Browning et al., 2008; Brunton-
Smith, Sutherland, and Jackson, 2014; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Wikstro¨m
et al., 2012). In these studies, researchers have focused on variation between neighbor-
hoods in the average of CE assessments. They have asked whether higher or lower av-
erage levels of CE across neighborhoods is (conditionally) related to outcomes such as
recorded crime, willingness to intervene, and perceptions of victimization risk. Consider-
ably less attention has been paid to differences between neighborhoods in the variability
of these assessments around their averages. Yet there are good reasons to believe that the
level of consensus in residents’ assessments of CE will also differ across neighborhoods
(Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner, 2016) and, moreover, that such differences will be con-
sequential for individual and community responses to crime and norm-violating behavior
(Downs and Rocke, 1979).
In this article, we consider CE from this perspective; we assess whether and how
variability in CE assessments is related to crime-relevant outcomes within neighbor-
hoods. Using data from a large random survey of London residents, we extend the
standard two-level, mixed-effects model (multilevel model or hierarchical linear model)
commonly employed in neighborhood effects research to a mixed-effects, location-
scale model (Hedeker, Mermelstein, and Demirtas, 2008). This allows us to model
the within-neighborhood heterogeneity in CE ratings as a function of characteristics
of not just neighborhoods but also the individual raters themselves. In addition to
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describing the patterning of CE consensus across and within neighborhoods, this also
enables an assessment of whether and how this heterogeneity is itself constitutive of
individual-level fear of crime, risk avoidance behavior, and the experience of violent
victimization.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we review the existing
literature on CE before setting out our theoretical expectations regarding the likely
consequences of variability in CE judgments across neighborhoods. We then describe
the data and measures on which our analysis is based and introduce the mixed-effects,
location-scale model. After presenting the results of our analysis, we conclude with a
consideration of the implications of our findings for understanding how levels of con-
sensus in CE judgments shape the patterning of crime and risk perception across local
areas.
COLLECTIVE EFFICACY: CENTRAL TENDENCY
AND VARIANCE
CE is now firmly embedded in the lexicon of modern criminological theory and em-
pirical research as an extension of classic theories of social disorganization (Park and
Burgess, 1925; Shaw and McKay, 1942; Thomas and Znaniecki, 1927). Although ques-
tions remain about its status as a direct causal factor in promoting informal social control
and preventing crime (Browning, 2009; Hipp and Wickes, 2017; Wickes et al., 2017) as
well as its applicability in non-U.S. contexts (Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, and Jackson,
2013; Villarreal and Silva, 2006), it has nevertheless become a key construct for guid-
ing research into the sociogeographic distribution of crime and disorder. First set out in
Sampson and colleagues’ pioneering research on the spatial patterning of crime in the
city of Chicago (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, 2012; Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997), CE has been proposed as the key social-psychological fac-
tor to account for why some neighborhoods with predisposing structural characteristics—
socioeconomic disadvantage, residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity—experience
high levels of crime, whereas others do not. In these and subsequent studies (Mazerolle,
Wickes andMcBroom, 2010; Odgers et al., 2009; Zhang, Messner, and Liu, 2007), scholars
have found that socially cohesive neighborhoods are characterized by cross-cutting social
networks and high levels of interpersonal trust, combined with a willingness of residents
to intervene to prevent norm-deviant behavior. In drawing on Bandura’s (1997) theory
of self-efficacy, Sampson, in his notion of CE, emphasized residents’ shared expectations
about the beliefs and likely actions of others, viewing this as underpinning a community’s
“latent capacity for action” (2013: 20). From this perspective, it is residents’ beliefs about
the likely behavior of others and not simply the objective level of informal social control,
or signs of disorder in the neighborhood, that are key to shaping community responses
and, therefore, to maintaining order.
Sampson and colleagues, in their original research, assessed how CE assessments
are related to sociodemographic characteristics of neighborhood residents (Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). The results of subsequent studies have shown that resi-
dents’ interpretations of the sorts of neighborhood structural properties that influence CE
assessments are shaped by subjectivities and local context. Here, the focus has been on
understanding the ways in which individual- and neighborhood-level characteristics are
related to residents’ interpretations of potential signs of disorder. For example, Sampson
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(2009) has shown that the same signifiers—an abandoned car, graffiti, a broken window—
are viewed differently, depending on residents’ beliefs about the ethnic composition and
social status of an area (see also Sampson, 2012; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004). An
abandoned car in a predominantlyWhite, middle-class area does not induce crime-related
cognitive schema to the same extent that it does in a predominantly Black, working-class
neighborhood. Thus, Sampson (2013: 17) argued that “norms about order are inherently
cognitive and contextual, conditioning responses to what are presumed to be objective
markers of disorder.” Similarly, Hipp (2010) showed that Whites, women, parents, and
longer term residents perceive higher levels of crime and disorder than do other demo-
graphic groups (see also Sampson, 2012), whereas in the United Kingdom, Sutherland,
Brunton-Smith, and Jackson (2013) found higher ratings of CE among older people,
ethnic minorities, and longer term residents.
In existing studies, then, scholars have identified a range of factors that seem to influ-
ence perceptions of the level of CE in a neighborhood and have described how variation
in levels of CE across spatial contexts is associated with recorded crime and the individ-
ual and collective action propensities of residents. Considerably less attention has been
paid, however, to the potential importance of heterogeneity in these judgments between
residents of the same neighborhood. There are good prima facie grounds, though, to antic-
ipate that the level of CE consensus will vary across local areas. This is because providing
judgments about the likely actions of others is difficult, requiring as it does, quantitative
assessments of the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors of a vaguely defined set of actors in a
broad range of contexts (Hipp, 2016). The amount and quality of information on which to
base such judgments, as well as an individual’s levels of exposure to relevant information,
will vary across neighborhoods and, in many instances, will be sparse. When information
about the local area is limited, there is increasing scope for people to interpret the same
information differently, either basing their judgments on assessments of their own capac-
ity to intervene (Reynald, 2010), their experiential knowledge of the environment (Hipp,
2016; Lippold et al., 2014), or relying on cognitive shortcuts and heuristics (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974).
In addition to interpreting the same informational cues in different ways, a key addi-
tional source of CE disagreement is likely to result from residents drawing on idiosyn-
cratic neighborhood definitions. In most quantitative studies, researchers implicitly as-
sume a shared understanding of neighborhood boundaries between residents, typically
approximated by administrative units such as blocks, block groups, census tracts, or zip
codes. In practice, however, residents of such well-defined areal units will have heteroge-
neous conceptions of what constitutes their actual neighborhood (Chaskin, 1997; Haney
and Knowles, 1978). From this more psychological perspective, neighborhoods are better
characterized as fuzzy and overlapping “ego-hoods” than as well-defined geographical
units with clearly defined and consensually understood boundaries (Hipp and Boessen,
2013; Sampson, 2002). In short, variability in CE consensus between neighborhoods will
result both from differences in evaluations of the same cues and from differences in the
cues and signals being evaluated.
We noted earlier that few existing studies have focused on the variability, as opposed
to average ratings, of CE. An exception is the work of Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner
(2016), who sought to integrate the apparently conflicting effects of ethnic heterogeneity
on both social disorganization and “immigrant revitalization” to explain variability in CE
consensus between local areas in Chicago and Los Angeles. In a large body of research,
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emanating most notably from Robert Putnam (2007), scholars have contended that, in
the short term at least, ethnic heterogeneity reduces interpersonal trust, fragments social
networks, and weakens attachment to norms of prosocial behavior (Alesina and La Fer-
rera, 2000, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003; Delhey and Newton, 2005). By way of contrast,
immigrant revitalization perspectives emphasize the social ties, local support networks,
and culturally oriented organizations that characterize many immigrant communities, and
which produce and reinforce place-based attachments and interpersonal trust (Browning
and Soller, 2014; Kubrin and Desmond, 2015). Browning and colleagues contended that
which of these two processes dominates in local areas depends on the size of the immi-
grant population; low levels of immigrant concentration result in social disorganization,
but as the proportion of immigrants in a neighborhood increases beyond a critical thresh-
old, processes of community revitalization come to dominate.
This nonlinearity, Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner (2016) argued, arises as a result of
changes in the “neighborhood narrative frames” of recently arrived immigrants as their
own ethnic share of the resident population increases over time. Neighborhood narra-
tive frames comprise a complex of preexisting cultural schema; levels of involvement in
community activities, strength of social networks, and knowledge about the actions of res-
idents, which render particular features of the local environment especially resonant for
different groups (Small, 2004). For instance, even though a local community center may
act as an important signifier of the potential for informal social control among long-term
residents, it is unlikely to serve the same function for recent arrivals, who lack the shared
community understanding of its role and functions. Frame convergence results from,
inter alia, growth in the number of local amenities such as shops, community centers,
sports clubs, and so on, which are targeted at the immigrant group. Thus, as immigrant
concentration increases, the neighborhood comes increasingly to be defined by all res-
idents as diverse and co-ethnic, leading to more widely shared understandings of the
community’s capacity to intervene and control deviant behavior. In both Chicago and
Los Angeles, Browning and colleagues found support for this expectation, observing a
U-shaped curvilinear association between the concentration of Latinos and the levels of
CE consensus within neighborhoods; when Latino concentration was low, CE consensus
decreased as the Latino share increased. Once the Latino share reached a threshold of
approximately 40 percent, however, further increases in Latino concentration resulted in
higher CE consensus.
Although our primary focus in this article is on the consequences rather than on the
causes of CE consensus, we begin our empirical analysis with an assessment of whether
the same nonlinearity generalizes to London, a city with a different history of immi-
gration, ethnic composition, and racial politics compared with American conurbations.
London has a large and growing immigrant population, with slightly more than a third of
inhabitants being foreign-born in 2015 (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva, 2017). The largest im-
migrant communities in London originate from former British colonies in the Caribbean,
Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, as well as more recently from Eastern Europe
(Greater London Authority, 2013). Ethnic minority groups in the United Kingdom
have experienced higher levels of social and economic disadvantage compared with
Whites, with poorer educational and employment outcomes (Runnymede Trust, 2000;
Weekes-Bernard, 2007), and higher rates of arrest and criminal conviction (Ministry of
Justice, 2011). Nonetheless, ethnically diverse communities in London are also associated
with urban renewal and civic vitality (Hall, 2011; Johnson, 2009) and have been shown to
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express higher levels of social cohesion compared with more homogenous and segregated
parts of the city (Sturgis et al., 2014). London, therefore, serves as a useful test bed for
assessing the generality of Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner’s (2016) conclusions regard-
ing the U-shaped relationship between immigrant concentration and CE consensus to
urban environments outside the United States.
CONSEQUENECES OF COLLECTIVE EFFICACY CONSENSUS
It seems likely that an inability to agree among neighborhood residents on their col-
lective inclination and capacity to exert formal and informal social control will mili-
tate against the mooted beneficial effects of higher average levels of CE. As Browning,
Dirlam, and Boettner noted, “higher levels of collective efficacy may not translate into
coordinated action on behalf of communities if also accompanied by substantial disagree-
ment” (2016: 800). Our theoretical expectation here turns on the importance of “theory
of mind” in Sampson’s account of CE, “a key argument of collective efficacy theory is
that it matters what I think others think, making collective efficacy a kind of deterrence
or moral rule—a generalized mechanism of ‘common knowledge’ that goes beyond any
single act of control” (2013: 20). Thus, insofar as residents’ expectations about the beliefs
and likely actions of others are central to determining whether a community has the ca-
pacity to act, latent social control processes will be less readily translated into collective
action in neighborhoods where CE consensus is low.
Findings from studies in the tradition of routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson,
1979; Felson, 2006) have demonstrated the central role of guardianship and the key func-
tion of knowledge and information about local context among guardians, in determining
victimization risk in a range of contexts (Garofolo and Clarke, 1992; Miethe and Meier,
1990; Rountree, Land, and Miethe, 1994). Lack of agreement about the level of CE is,
we contend, likely to inhibit the availability of “capable guardians” willing to intervene in
local areas, which in turn serves to facilitate victimization by motivated offenders as they
come together in time and space with suitable targets (Felson, 2006). As Reynald put it,
“the more knowledge and experience residential guardians have with their context, about
crime and about self-protective behaviors, the more confident they will be about their
capability, and the greater their willingness to intervene” (2011: 119). In essence, then,
where the signs and signifiers of local interpersonal trust, social cohesion, and willingness
to intervene are “noisy,” the protective effects of CE in a local area will be diminished
and, by the same token, will be accentuated in areas where the CE “signal” is stronger
(Jackson, 2006). These expectations lead to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The negative association between (higher) average levels of
CE and individual-level worry about victimization within local areas is stronger at
higher levels of CE consensus.
If a lack of consensus about the level of CE in a neighborhood inhibits its ability to
support collective action and reduces residents’ concerns about the risk of victimization,
we should expect low levels of CE consensus to affect behavioral as well as psychological
outcomes. For example, it should result in residents deliberately avoiding locations and
situations where they believe they are more likely to be subject to antisocial behavior or
to be a victim of crime. This leads to our second hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The negative association between (higher) average levels of CE
and crime-related risk avoidance behavior within local areas is stronger at higher
levels of CE consensus.
Our third hypothesis relates to actual victimization experiences. If neighborhood res-
idents do not expect others to provide support when they are deciding whether to
intervene in threatening situations, the deterrent benefits of guardianship and “eyes on
the street” will be less readily translated into effective social control (Jacobs, 1961). Thus,
in contexts where residents cannot reliably assess the degree of CE in their local area,
the availability of capable guardians and their willingness to intervene will be reduced,
resulting in more encounters between motivated offenders and unprotected targets. Our
third hypothesis is therefore:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The negative association between (higher) average levels of CE
and individual experiences of victimization within local areas is stronger at higher
levels of CE consensus.
DATA ANDMEASURES
Our data are drawn from the U.K. Metropolitan Police Public Attitude Survey (MET-
PAS), a face-to-face survey of London residents 15 years of age and older. METPAS was
initially established to inform policing priorities in London, but it has increasingly been
used to provide in-depth information on the experiences of London residents (see, e.g.,
Bradford, Jackson, and Stanko, 2009; Jackson et al., 2012; Sturgis et al., 2014). It has a
multistage sample design, with households randomly selected from the Post Office Ad-
dress File within each of London’s 32 boroughs each quarter.1 We use the April 2007
to March 2010 rounds of the survey, with a response rate over the 3 years of 60 percent
(Cello, 2009). This is comparable to the response rate of other large-scale social surveys,
and comparisons with the 2001 U.K. national census reveal that the sample is broadly
representative of the population of London, with a slight underrepresentation of young
(aged 15–34) White residents (Cello, 2009).
We use the Middle Layer Super Output Area (MSOA) census geography (Martin,
2001) to represent neighborhoods. MSOAs are broadly equivalent to U.S. census tracts
and provide an approximation to a plausible neighborhood geography, comprising an av-
erage of 4,000 households that are grouped together based on similarity of housing tenure,
with an average size of .6 square miles. During the construction of MSOAs, consideration
was given to the presence of major roadways and other physical barriers within the en-
vironment that may signify the boundary of a neighborhood area for residents. Data are
available for a total of 46,346 residents within 982 MSOAs across London (an average of
47 sampled residents in each area).
1. The City of London was not included in the METPAS sample frame as it is not under the ju-
risdiction of the Metropolitan Police force. London is atypical, acting primarily as a business and
financial center with a very low resident population (approximately 7,000) but a very high day-time
population (approximately 300,000).
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COLLECTIVE EFFICACY
Collective efficacy is measured using six items tapping different aspects of social co-
hesion and informal social control, which closely mirror the questions used by Sampson,
Raudenbush, and Earls (1997). For each item, respondents rated their local area on a
five-point Likert scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5):
1. People in this neighborhood can be trusted.
2. People act with courtesy to each other in public spaces in this area.
3. You can see from the public space here that people take pride in their
environment.
4. If any of the children or young people around here are causing trouble, local peo-
ple will tell them off.
5. The people who live here can be relied upon to call the police if someone is acting
suspiciously.
6. If I sensed trouble whilst in this area, I could get help from people who live here.
Responses to all six items were combined using exploratory factor analysis (EFA).2 A
single factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted, representing the overall
rating of neighborhood collective efficacy for each individual (details of the factor model
and parameter estimates are included in table A1 in the appendix). Higher scores on the
factor score correspond to assessments of higher collective efficacy.
WORRY ABOUT VICTIMIZATION
Worry about victimization is measured using four items. Respondents were asked how
worried they were about having your home broken into and something stolen, being
mugged or robbed in this area, being insulted or pestered by anybody whilst in the street,
and being physically attacked by a stranger in the street in this area. For each item, the
response alternatives were “not at all worried,” “not very worried,” “fairly worried,” and
“very worried.” EFA was used to combine the scores from each item, with factors re-
tained if they had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This identified a single summary scale,
with higher sores indicating more worry about crime overall (factor loadings included in
table A1 in the appendix).
RISK AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOR
Respondents were asked three questions about their risk avoidance behavior: How
often do you do these things in your local area, simply as a precaution against crime –
i) avoid using public transport, ii) avoid particular streets during the day, and iii) avoid
particular streets at night (never = 0, occasionally = 1, sometimes = 2, most of the time =
3, always= 4). These items were combined into a single count variable from 0 to 12, where
0 identifies those respondents who had never taken any precautionary measures against
crime and 12 identifies those that responded “always” to all three items.
2. Like the IRT model used by Sampson and colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997;
Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999), this makes adjustments for measurement error in the individual
items. We adopt a two-stage approach to enable inclusion of our CE ratings within the location-
scale model specification.
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VIOLENT VICTIMIZATION
We use a binary indicator that records whether the respondent reported being a victim
of any violent crime in the local area during the previous 12 months. Respondents first re-
ported whether they had been a victim of crime, with a follow-up question requiring them
to state whether this was violent, property related, or other. We focus here on violent
crime because these offenses have been more frequently shown to be affected by collec-
tive efficacy (Armstrong, Katz, and Schnelby, 2015; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls,
1997; Wikstro¨m et al., 2012). These questions were only included in the final year of data
collection (April 2009–March 2010), reducing the analytic sample to 16,021.
NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
We link variables from the 2001 U.K. census to MSOAs to control for structural char-
acteristics of local areas. A total of 21 raw census count variables were combined using a
factorial ecology model (Rees, 1971), with a total of five neighborhood indices extracted
(details of the full factor structure are included in table A2 in the appendix). These mea-
sures cover the extent of concentrated disadvantage (areas with a higher number of sin-
gle parent families, those on income support and unemployed, fewer people in manage-
rial and professional occupations, and less owner occupiers), urbanicity (high population
density and domestic properties and little green space), and population mobility (higher
levels of in- and out-migration and more single-person households). We also account for
differences in the neighborhood age structure (with higher scores for areas with a younger
population), and housing structure (higher scores for areas with more terraced and vacant
properties). The sample size in each neighborhood is also recorded. The ethnic composi-
tion of the local area is measured by the percentage share of each ethnic group (Asian,
Black, Other) in each MSOA, as well as by a quadratic term to allow for nonlinearity.
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS
To account for differences in fear of crime, risk avoidance, and victimization that have
been identified in existing literature (for reviews, see Hale, 1996; Pratt and Cullen, 2005;
Rubin, Gallo, and Coutts, 2008) and that might otherwise be attributed to our theoreti-
cal predictors of interest, we include individual-level controls for gender, age, ethnicity,
marital status, social class, housing tenure, and work status.
MODELING STRATEGY
We use a mixed-effects, location-scale model (Hedeker, Mermelstein, and Demirtas,
2008). This extends the standard two-level, mixed-effects model by relaxing the assump-
tion of a common level 1 variance, instead allowing it to vary randomly across level 2
units and as a function of covariates. Whereas Hedeker et al. proposed their model in the
context of analyzing intensive longitudinal data, it has since also been applied to cross-
sectional settings (Brunton-Smith, Sturgis, and Leckie, 2017; Leckie et al., 2014). In the
present case, we have individuals at level 1 within neighborhoods at level 2, and so it is
the within-neighborhood (between individual) variance in CE assessments that we allow
to vary from neighborhood to neighborhood, in addition to the usual mean differences.
Let yi j denote the continuous CE assessment score derived from our EFA for indi-
vidual i(i = 1, . . . ,nj ) living in neighborhood j( j = 1, . . . , J ). The standard two-level,
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random-intercept, mixed-effect model for yi j to derive covariate adjusted mean CE esti-
mates for each neighborhood can then be written as:
yi j = x′i jβ+ uj + ei j (1)
where xi j is a vector of individual- and area-level covariates with coefficient vector β, uj is
a random intercept representing unobserved influences common to all individu-
als in neighborhood j , and ei j is the residual. The random effect and residual
are assumed independent of one another and of the covariates and to be nor-
mally distributed with zero means and constant variances, uj ∼ N(0, σ 2u ), and ei j ∼
N(0, σ 2e ). The between-neighborhood random effect variance σ
2
u captures the vari-
ability in covariate adjusted mean levels of CE across neighborhoods and can
be used to derive (reliability adjusted) posterior estimates, uˆ j , for each neighbor-
hood. The within-neighborhood or residual variance σ 2e measures the average vari-
ability in residents’ CE assessments that are unexplained by the model. Including
individual- and neighborhood-level covariates enables examination of systematic differ-
ences in individual assessments of CE between individuals with different characteris-
tics, and how mean CE differs across neighborhoods after controlling for neighborhood
differences in the compositions of individuals.
The degree of residual clustering in the data is typically then assessed by the intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC), derived as ρ = σ 2u (σ 2u + σ 2e )−1 and interpreted both as the
proportion of unexplained variation that lies between neighborhoods and as the correla-
tion in adjusted responses between two randomly selected residents in the same neigh-
borhood. The ICC can therefore be used as a measure of consensus in assessments of CE
among residents in the same area, with a higher ICC indicating greater consensus.
To examine how the degree of consensus in CE ratings differs across neighborhoods,
we relax the assumption of a constant within-neighborhood variance, which is to say that
although σ 2e is constrained to be equal across all neighborhoods in equation 1, the mixed-
effects, location-scale model relaxes this assumption by specifying an auxiliary log-linear
equation for this variance as a function of covariates and as an additional neighborhood
random effect. This allows neighborhoods to differ in the residual variability (i.e., the
degree of between resident agreement in CE ratings) once direct effects on the mean
have been accounted for. The log link function ensures the within-neighborhood variance
takes positive values. It is written as:
ln
(
σ 2ei j
)
= w′i jα+ u[2]j (2)
where ln(σ 2ei j ) is the log of the now heterogeneous within-neighborhood variance, wi j is
a vector of individual- and neighborhood-level covariates with coefficient vector α, and
u[2]j is the additional neighborhood random effect. We use the “[2]” superscript to distin-
guish this random effect from the usual neighborhood random effect in equation 1, which
we now denote u[1]j . Positive coefficients in α identify individual and neighborhood char-
acteristics associated with more variable CE assessments, whereas negative coefficients
identify individual and neighborhood characteristics associated with less variable CE
assessments.
In the terminology of the mixed-effects, location-scale model, the u[1]j are “location”
(i.e., mean) random effects, whereas the u[2]j are “scale” (i.e., variance) random effects.
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The two sets of neighborhood random effects are assumed bivariate normally distributed
with zero mean vector and constant variance–covariance matrix:⎛
⎝u[1]j
u[2]j
⎞
⎠ ∼ N
⎧⎨
⎩
(
0
0
)
,
⎛
⎝ σ 2u[1]
σu[1]u[2] σ
2
u[2]
⎞
⎠
⎫⎬
⎭ (3)
The variance–covariance matrix summarizes how neighborhoods differ in average lev-
els of CE (summarized by σ 2u[1]) and in the variability of their residents’ CE assessments
(summarized by σ 2u[2]). The association between the mean and variance random effects
(σu[1]u[2]) can also be estimated.3 This can then be used to derive posterior estimates of
the neighborhood-specific CE variance random effects, uˆ[2]j , in addition to the neighbor-
hood mean CE random effects, now uˆ[1]j .
By specifying heterogeneous within-neighborhood variances, it follows that the ICC
now also varies across neighborhoods and as a function of the covariates, allowing analysis
of the heterogeneity in neighborhood agreement in CE ratings. The usual population-
averaged ICC yielded by the standardmixed-effects model is recovered by first calculating
the population-averaged within-neighborhood variance:
E
(
σ 2ei j |wi j
)
= exp
(
w′i jα+ 0.5σ 2u[2]
)
(4)
and then substituting this for the level 1 variance in the expression for the ICC.
To test hypotheses H1 to H3, conventional two-level, mixed-effects models (equiva-
lent to equation 1) are fitted separately to the three individual outcome variables: worry
about victimization, risk avoidance behavior, and violent victimization experience. The
(reliability adjusted) posterior estimates of the location and scale random effects uˆ[1]j and
uˆ[2]j derived from equation 3 are included as predictors, as well as the interaction between
these two sets of predicted random effects to allow consensus to moderate the effect of
mean CE on each outcome. To ensure that effects of the measure of neighborhood CE
consensus are not the result of differences in the levels of outcome variable for those
that depart the most from the neighborhood mean CE, we also control for individual CE
ratings.
ANALYSIS
Model 1 is a mixed-effects, location-scale model with no covariates, which allows the
within-neighborhood variance in CE ratings to vary across areas in addition to the usual
partitioning of the total variability in CE ratings into within- and between-neighborhood
variance components. Significant variation in the within-neighborhood variance across
local areas implies that residents of different neighborhoods vary in their level of CE con-
sensus. Model 2 incorporates the individual- and area-level covariates and the measures
3. A nonlinear association between the mean and the variance is also permissible, allowing for the
fact that the variability of CE assessments may be lower in neighborhoods with very high or low
average estimates of CE (Hedeker and Nordgren, 2013; Leckie, 2014). An examination of the
residuals, however, suggested a linear covariance was sufficient in the current analysis.
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Table 1. Model 1: Mixed-Effects, Location-Scale Model With No
Covariates
Variables Mean (SD) 2.5% 97.5%
Constant (beta) .017 (.011) −.004 .038
Constant (alpha) −.173 (.013) −.199 −.148
Random Effects
Area Location Effect Variance .089 (.005) .079 .099
Area Scale Effect Variance .119 (.008) .104 .136
Location-Scale Covariance −.048 (.005) −.057 −.039
Location-Scale Correlation −.466 — — —
ICC (Pop. Avg.) .090 — — —
N of respondents 46,346
DIC 125,443
ABBREVIATIONS: DIC = Deviance Information Criterion; ICC (Pop. Avg.) = intraclass correlation (popu-
lation average); SD = standard deviation.
of the proportion of each ethnic group in the local area, as well as a quadratic term to
allow for nonlinearity. In models 3 through 5, we fit conventional mixed-effects models
to test our hypotheses regarding the relationship between CE consensus and residents’
worry about crime, risk avoidance behavior, and violent victimization experience. Linear,
logit, and Poisson link functions are specified for each outcome, respectively. All models
are estimated using Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods as implemented in the
Stat-JR statistics package (Charlton et al., 2013).
RESULTS
Model 1 (table 1) shows that most variability in CE ratings is between residents, with
neighborhoods accounting for 9 percent of the total variance (ICC (Pop. Avg.) = .090).
This falls in the middle of the range of estimates from previous studies, in which between
5 percent and 20 percent of the variation in CE is found to be situated at the neighborhood
level (Raudenbush and Sampson, 1999).
The scale equation variance of .12 reveals that there are significant differences between
neighborhoods in their level of CE consensus, mirroring the findings of Browning,
Dirlam, and Boettner (2016) in Chicago and LA neighborhoods. The distribution of this
between-neighborhood variability in CE consensus is presented graphically in figure 1,
which plots the model estimated ICC for each of the 982 MSOAs in London, with 95
percent credible intervals (note that the higher the ICC, the smaller the neighborhood
residual variance and therefore the higher the level of CE consensus). The figure shows
that the MSOA ICCs vary considerably around the population-average ICC of .09
(indicated by the horizontal line), with 95 MSOAs (10 percent) having an ICC that is
significantly lower than this London-wide average, and 132 MSOAs (13 percent) with
an ICC significantly higher than this average. In short, CE is more “collective” in some
neighborhoods than it is in others.
There is a moderate negative correlation (–.466) between the neighborhood location
and scale random effects, such that areas with higher average CE also tend to exhibit
more consensus about its extent in the local area. This covariance may, in part, be an
artefact resulting from the response scales on which the CE indicator variables are
measured creating “ceiling” effects (Brunton-Smith, Sturgis, and Leckie, 2017). As
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Figure 1. Ranked Neighborhood ICC Presented with 95% Credible
Intervals
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respondent ratings move from the top to the middle of the response scale, the mean by
definition decreases, but the variance is also likely to increase because there are more
response options available from which respondents can choose. This negative correlation
may also arise substantively if neighborhoods that have high levels of CE are also richer
in contextual cues and signifiers on which judgments are based, leading to a higher level
of agreement between residents.
When we turn tomodel 2 in table 2, we see that the population average ICC has reduced
to .069 with the addition of the individual- and neighborhood-level covariates. Although
the fixed effects in the location equation are not our primary interest in this article, it is
worth noting that ratings of CE are higher among older residents, Asians and Blacks, full-
time workers, and longer term neighborhood residents. In contrast, single people, those
in lower social class groups, and people in rented accommodations report lower levels of
CE. At the neighborhood level, average CE is lower in more economically disadvantaged
and more urban neighborhoods, and in neighborhoods that have a higher concentration
of terraced housing and flats. The direction of these coefficients is consistent with exist-
ing studies (Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls,
1997), although it is notable that ethnic minority groups have generally been found to re-
port lower levels of perceived CE than Whites (Mennis, Dayanim, and Grunwald, 2013;
Twigg, Taylor, and Mohan, 2010).
In the model 2 scale equation, individuals in higher social class groups, home owners,
and full-time employees show higher levels of CE consensus, while women and single
or divorced people have lower rates of agreement about the local level of CE (posi-
tive coefficients in the scale equation indicate characteristics associated with mover vari-
able assessments and hence lower CE consensus). To give some sense of the substantive
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Table 2. Model 2: Mixed-Effects, Location-Scale Model With Covariates
(Location and Scale)
Location Equation (Beta) Scale Equation (Alpha)
Variables Mean (SD) 2.5% 97.5% Mean (SD) 2.5% 97.5%
Constant −.249 (.053) −.357 −.145 −.279 (.066) −.405 −.151
Female .002 (.009) −.015 .019 .040 (.015) .011 .068
Age (centered) .029 (.003) .022 .036 .020 (.006) .009 .031
Ethnicity (ref: White)
Asian .140 (.014) .113 .166 −.085 (.023) −.130 −.039
Black .119 (.014) .092 .146 −.092 (.023) −.137 −.047
Mixed/other .049 (.016) .018 .079 −.083 (.026) −.135 −.031
Marital Status (ref: Married)
Single −.079 (.012) −.102 −.056 .149 (.019) .111 .186
Widowed −.044 (.018) −.080 −.008 .023 (.028) −.032 .078
Divorced/separated −.180 (.019) −.218 −.142 .202 (.029) .146 .258
Social Class (ref: Class A/B)
Class C −.055 (.012) −.079 −.031 .056 (.021) .015 .098
Class D/E −.043 (.016) −.074 −.011 .114 (.026) .062 .166
Tenure (ref: Privately Owned)
Rented (social) −.159 (.012) −.182 −.135 .195 (.019) .158 .232
Rented (private) −.177 (.012) −.201 −.154 −.015 (.021) −.055 .025
Rented (other) −.127 (.036) −.197 −.056 .180 (.054) .075 .288
Work Status (ref: Employed Full-Time)
Part-time −.060 (.016) −.092 −.028 .099 (.027) .047 .151
Student −.018 (.021) −.059 .022 −.078 (.036) −.148 −.007
Not-working −.074 (.012) −.098 −.050 .115 (.020) .077 .153
Neighborhood Measures
Concentrated Disadvantage −.157 (.019) −.195 −.120 .029 (.027) −.023 .081
Population Mobility .002 (.013) −.024 .029 −.042 (.018) −.078 −.006
Urbanicity −.063 (.011) −.085 −.041 .008 (.016) −.023 .038
Age Profile .009 (.012) −.015 .032 .020 (.017) −.013 .051
Housing Structure −.102 (.017) −.135 −.070 .006 (.023) −.038 .050
Proportion Asian −.693 (.237) −1.154 −.217 .544 (.325) −.117 1.159
Proportion Asian2 .987 (.415) .156 1.799 −1.182 (.568) −2.254 −.029
Proportion Black −.674 (.381) −1.427 .060 1.333 (.565) .244 2.482
Proportion Black2 1.816 (.834) .204 3.464 −2.581 (1.232) −5.012 −.137
Proportion Mixed/Other 13.329 (1.769) 9.704 16.852 −5.225 (2.236) −10.062 −1.326
Proportion Mixed/Other2 −71.117 (11.050) −93.053 −48.200 15.188 (14.222) −10.264 46.017
Cluster Size (centered) −.002 (.000) −.003 −.001 .002 (.001) .001 .003
Random Effects
Area Location Effect Variance .058 (.004) .052 .066
Area Scale Effect Variance .104 (.007) .090 .119
Location-Scale Covariance −.030 (.004) −.038 −.023
Location-Scale Correlation −.390 — — —
ICC (Pop. Avg.) .069 — — —
N of respondents 46,346
DIC 123,855
ABBREVIATIONS: DIC = deviance information criterion; ICC (Pop. Avg.) = intraclass correlation (popula-
tion average); SD = standard deviation.
magnitude of these differences, we can calculate population average within-area variances
and associated ICCs (equation 4) for each characteristic, while holding all other variables
at their mean (see table A3 in the appendix). This shows that, for example, CE consensus
is approximately 11 percent higher for those in the highest social class group compared
with those in the lowest (.071 vs. .064), 21 percent higher for married compared with
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Figure 2. Percentage Residents from Black and Asian Backgrounds and
Collective Efficacy Consensus
.05
.06
.07
.08
.09
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
C
E
 c
on
es
nu
s (
pr
ed
ite
d 
IC
C
)
Percent Black Percent Asian
divorced people, and 20 percent higher for home owners compared with social renters
(.070 vs. .059).
We find the same nonlinear relationship between immigrant concentration and CE con-
sensus in London as Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner (2016) did for Latinos in Chicago
and LA, with lower levels of CE consensus as the share of Black residents increases up
to a threshold of approximately 30 percent, beyond which further increases in the pro-
portion of Black residents increases CE consensus. The same pattern is evident for the
proportion of Asian residents, although the estimates for the main effect coefficients are
not significantly different from zero. These nonlinear relationships can be seen in figure 2,
which plots the predicted neighborhood intraclass correlations from model 2 against the
percentage of Black and Asian residents in the neighborhood.
Table 3 presents the key parameter estimates for the models predicting individual fear
of crime, risk avoidance behavior, and experience of violent crime as a function of average
levels of CE, CE consensus, and their interaction. Recall that these CE measures are
derived as posterior estimates of the neighborhood location and scale random effects
from model 1, such that a higher level of CE consensus is identified as an area with a
lower predicted scale effect uˆ[2]j (less variable CE ratings). To preserve space, we present
only the fixed-effect coefficients for these parameters in table 3; the full set of parameter
estimates for these models is included in the appendix (table A4).
We find support for hypotheses H1 and H3; the negative associations between average
levels of CE and individual level fear of crime (model 3) and violent victimization experi-
ence (model 5) are significantly stronger in areas characterized by higher levels of CE con-
sensus. CE consensus does not, however, moderate the effect of average CE on risk avoid-
ance behavior, and the main effect of CE consensus in model 2 is significant and positive,
however, suggesting that the level of CE consensus has an independent role in shaping
residents’ propensities to deliberately avoid certain parts of the neighborhood than mean
levels of CE. We will return to a consideration of this unexpected result in the discussion.
These effects are presented graphically in figure 3, which plots the predicted score on
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Figure 3. How Worry, Risk Avoidance, and Criminal Victimization
Varies as a Function of Collective Efficacy Mean and
Consensus
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each outcome as a function of mean CE, by terciles of CE consensus. Expressed worry
about crime (top panel) declines as the mean level of neighborhood CE increases at all
levels of CE consensus, but the rate of decrease is greater the higher the level of CE
consensus. The same interaction is evident for violent victimization experience (bottom
panel), although within the lowest tercile of CE consensus there is no association between
the mean level of CE and the probability of having been a victim of violent crime. It is
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notable that the moderating effect of CE consensus is greater at high average levels of
CE, which is to say that residents do not provide substantially lower ratings of CE when
there is a high degree of consensus about this judgment, compared with when consensus
is low. The moderating effect of CE consensus appears, then, to be asymmetric in that
its effect is greatest at high average levels of CE, although caution must be exercised in
drawing this conclusion, based as it is on only two out of the three items that have been
considered here.
DISCUSSION
A key feature of the theory of collective efficacy is that it relates to individuals’ beliefs
about the attitudes and likely behavior of other neighborhood residents. It concerns,
fundamentally, what people believe other residents think and how they are likely to act
in different situations and contexts (Sampson, 2012). This inherently social-psychological
orientation implies that, for a variety of reasons, residents will differ in the judgments they
make about CE and there will most likely be variability in the level of consensus about
CE across neighborhoods. Existing research into the causes and consequences of CE
has been focused almost entirely on neighborhood differences in average levels of CE,
with little attention paid to the potential substantive importance of heterogeneity in the
degree of agreement in these collective judgments. Our objective in this article has been
to address this gap in understanding by investigating whether variability in CE consensus
across local areas is consequential for residents’ crime-related attitudes, behaviors, and
experiences.
Using a mixed-effects, location-scale model (Hedeker, Mermelstein, and Demirtas,
2008), our findings show that heterogeneity in CE consensus in London is related to the
ethnic composition of neighborhoods. When the share of Black residents in a neighbor-
hood is low, CE consensus decreases as Black concentration increases. But when the total
share of Black residents moves beyond a threshold of approximately 30 percent, further
increases in Black concentration are associated with higher levels of CE consensus. The
same nonlinear association was also evident for the proportion of Asian residents, al-
though the effect was weaker and was not statistically significant. Our findings mirror
those of Browning, Dirlam, and Boettner (2016), who observed the same nonlinear re-
lationship for Latino concentration in Chicago and LA neighborhoods. These authors
attributed this effect to a convergence of neighborhood narrative frames (Small, 2004),
which occurs as the immigrant concentration reaches a threshold. This threshold repre-
sents an inflection point at which the result of further increases in ethnic concentration
change from processes of social disorganization (Putnam, 2007) to “immigrant revitaliza-
tion” (Browning and Soller, 2014; Kubrin andDesmond, 2015), such that further increases
in ethnic concentration increase community cohesion, trust, and shared beliefs about will-
ingness to intervene. Our results support this conclusion by replicating the nonlinear as-
sociation in a new context, London, which, though different in important ways to Chicago
and LA, also shares many of the same ethno-racial social and economic inequalities as
well as a notable vitality in many ethnically diverse local communities.
The key contribution of this study has been to assess, for the first time, whether vari-
ability in the consensus of judgments is related to the sorts of crime-related outcomes
that CE has been posited to influence (Brunton-Smith, Sutherland, and Jackson, 2014;
Farrall, Jackson, and Gray, 2009; Nix et al., 2015; Sampson, Raundenbush, and Earls,
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1997; Sampson, 2009). An essential feature of Sampson’s conception of CE is that it
relates to residents’ beliefs about the likely attitudes and behavior of other people in
the neighborhood. It follows from this that in neighborhoods where CE consensus is low,
residents’ ability to make inferences of this nature will be impeded. In line with this theo-
retical expectation, we found that CE consensus in London neighborhoods moderates the
association between average levels of CE and both worry about crime and experience of
violent victimization. In neighborhoods with low levels of CE consensus, the association
between average levels of CE and these outcomes are close to zero. This, we contend, is
because when the signs and signals of social cohesion, trust, and willingness to intervene
are “noisy,” the protective effects of higher average levels of CE in a local area are di-
minished. When CE signifiers are “clearer,” residents will be more confident that others
will intervene, or support their own interventions in threatening situations, increasing the
pool of capable guardians, which in turn reduces the frequency of situations where moti-
vated offenders encounter unprotected targets (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Reynald, 2011).
This moderating effect of consensus may explain some of the mixed findings in the exist-
ing literature on the relationship between CE on levels of crime and anti-social behavior,
as in none of these studies was variability in CE consensus across areas taken into account
(Browning, 2009; Hipp and Wickes, 2017; Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, and Jackson, 2013;
Villarreal and Silva, 2006; Wickes et al., 2017).
We did not find a moderating effect of CE consensus for the model predicting risk
avoidance behavior, although the main effect of CE consensus was significant, such that
residents were more likely to report avoiding certain places in the neighborhood when
CE consensus was low. Therefore, CE consensus may have a direct influence on some
crime-related outcomes, in addition to its moderating influence on average levels of CE.
It is possible that this arises because an inability to assess the level of CE reliably in a
neighborhood can itself serve as a source of crime-related anxiety for residents. Evolu-
tionary biologists have long known that humans and other animals use environmental
cues to assess the probability of danger and to respond appropriately through the “fight
or flight” response of the sympathetic nervous system (Cannon, 1932). Crucially, it is not
only obviously threatening cues, such as signs of predators, that result in acute stress, but
also ambiguity in environmental cues can induce the “fight or flight” response because an
inability to assess the level of threat as a result of ambiguity of available stimuli is anxiety
provoking in its own right (Nader and Balleine, 2007; Tsetsenis et al., 2007). This is of
course somewhat speculative and based on a single outcome in one location, but it never-
theless suggests ways in which research into the consequences of CE consensus might be
extended in future studies.
This study is not without limitations. First, it is possible that some variability between
areas that we attribute to differences in CE consensus between residents may in part
reflect differential measurement error arising from survey interviewers. Brunton-Smith,
Sturgis, and Leckie (2017) found substantial within-interviewer heterogeneity in survey
responses in face-to-face interviews, suggesting interviewers are an important source of
survey outcome variance (see also Davis and Scott, 1995; Mangione, Fowler, and Louis,
1992; Schnell and Kreuter, 2005; West, Kreuter, and Jaenichen, 2013). This may, in
turn, attenuate the moderating effect of CE consensus on worry about victimization, risk
avoidance, and victimization experience. Given that our choice of neighborhood bound-
aries, however, is not coterminous with interviewer assignments on the METPAS sur-
vey, we believe the potential risk of contaminating effects of interviewers to be minimal.
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Unfortunately, we cannot reject this possibility definitively because we could not obtain
the interviewer identifiers in the data.
Second, a note of caution is warranted regarding the interpretation of these rela-
tionships as causal effects, given our reliance on cross-sectional data. Sharkey, Torrats-
Espinosa, and Delaram Takyar (2017) showed that because community organizations are
often formed in response to high rates of violent crime, the findings from cross-sectional
analysis will tend to show a positive correlation between concentration of community or-
ganizations and crime rates, when the causal effect is negative. Similarly, the relationship
between ethnic minority concentration and CE consensus may arise, at least in part, as a
result of residential sorting, with people who select into homogenously White areas being
more likely to possess the sorts of characteristics associated with providing more variable
assessments of CE in their neighborhood (Abascal and Baldassari, 2015). This alterna-
tive explanation is supported by the fact that, in addition to the association with Black
and Asian concentration, we also found CE consensus to be lower among lower status
groups in society such as social renters, lower skilled and manual occupations, divorcees,
and women. In research into neighborhood social capital and generalized trust, scholars
have found a similar pattern of associations with demographic variables and have pointed
to the denser and deeper social networks and informal ties of higher status groups as the
explanatory mechanism (Hooghe and Stolle, 2003; Putnam, 2000). These kinds of social
network effects may also produce greater CE consensus among social and economically
advantaged groups as information on the likely actions of others is more easily commu-
nicated between residents within denser social networks (Hipp, 2016; Sampson, Rauden-
bush, and Earls, 1997). Be that as it may, the research design we have used here pro-
vides little leverage on the causes of these between-group differences and future research
could usefully be aimed at addressing the mechanisms driving the associations between
resident- and neighborhood-level characteristics and CE consensus.
While acknowledging these caveats, our findings nonetheless add to a growing under-
standing in criminology of how structural features of local areas seem to influence crime
and disorder indirectly, through social-psychological filters of cognition, judgment, and
affect (Mazerolle, Wickes, and McBroom, 2010; Mennis, Dayanim, and Grunwald, 2013;
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Zhang, Messner, and Liu, 2007). We have shown
that, for a fuller account of how CE functions in local environments, it is necessary to con-
sider not only the average but also the variability across individuals and neighborhoods in
these assessments. That the level of consensus in these kinds of judgments about collec-
tive community resources seems to play a key role in shaping the patterning of crime and
disorder adds an important new perspective to neighborhood research. Much, however,
remains to be understood about the causes and consequences of CE consensus, including
other structural features of local environments, the generality of these findings in other
national and international contexts, and to other indicators of crime and disorder. These,
we contend, represent useful avenues for future research.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Factor Loadings for Collective Efficacy and Worry About
Crime
Variables Factor Loadings
Collective Efficacy
People in this neighborhood can be trusted .735
People act with courtesy to each other in public spaces in this area .733
You can see from the public space here in the area that people take pride in their
environment
.706
If any of the children or young people around here are causing trouble, local people
will tell them off
.729
The people who live here can be relied upon to call the police if someone is acting
suspiciously
.707
If I sensed trouble whilst in this area, I could get help from people who live here .572
Eigenvalue 2.932
Worry About Crime
How worried are you about having your home broken into and something stolen? .691
How worried are you about being mugged or robbed in this area? .774
How worried are you about being insulted or pestered by anybody whilst in the
street
.896
How worried are you about being physically attacked by a stranger in the street in
this area?
.842
Eigenvalue 2.589
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Table A2. Factor Loadings for Neighborhood Factorial Ecology
Variables
Concentrated
Disadvantage Urbanicity
Population
Mobility Age Profile
Housing
Profile
Working Population on Income Support .890 .245 .191 .138 .092
Lone Parent Families .847 .222 .002 .263 .153
Local Authority Housing .846 .064 −.009 .146 −.168
Working Population Unemployed .843 .293 .173 .118 .125
Non-Car-Owning Households .798 .417 .363 −.010 .057
Working in Professional/Managerial Role −.787 .002 .153 .146 −.368
Owner-Occupied Housing −.608 −.249 −.349 −.572 .053
Domestic Property .104 .921 .165 .052 .112
Green Space −.214 −.902 −.180 −.011 −.043
Population Density (per Square KM) .245 .824 .262 .150 −.135
Working in Agriculture −.126 −.663 −.006 −.183 −.030
In Migration −.074 .102 .916 .069 .071
Out Migration −.019 .162 .903 .119 .134
Single Person, Non-Pensioner Households .355 .364 .743 .134 −.092
Commercial Property .378 .432 .529 .019 −.093
More than 1.5 People Per Room .428 .472 .507 .197 −.326
Resident Population Older than 65 −.052 −.210 −.271 −.892 −.021
Resident Population Younger than 16 .427 .040 −.464 .635 .190
Terraced Housing .323 .263 .102 .274 .689
Vacant Property .319 −.118 .485 −.173 .530
Flats .453 .359 .489 .008 −.524
Eigenvalue 9.292 3.270 1.904 1.426 1.275
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Table A3. Variance Estimates and Predicted ICC
Variable Variance Estimate ICC
Population Average .778 .069
Male .794 .068
Female .826 .066
Age (25%) .784 .069
Age (75%) .832 .065
Ethnicity (ref: White) .834 .065
Asian .766 .070
Black .760 .071
Mixed/other .767 .070
Marital Status (ref: Married) .769 .070
Single .892 .061
Widowed .787 .069
Divorced/separated .941 .058
Social class (ref: Class A/B) .761 .071
Class C .805 .067
Class D/E .853 .064
Tenure (ref: Privately Owned) .766 .070
Rented (social) .931 .059
Rented (private) .755 .071
Rented (other) .917 .059
Work Status (ref: Employed Full Time) .772 .070
Part time .852 .064
Student .713 .075
Not-working .866 .063
Neighborhood Measures
Concentrated Disadvantage (25%) .792 .068
Concentrated Disadvantage (75%) .826 .066
Population Mobility (25%) .838 .065
Population Mobility (75%) .790 .068
Urbanicity (25%) .807 .067
Urbanicity (75%) .814 .066
Age Profile (25%) .802 .067
Age Profile (75%) .821 .066
Housing Structure (25%) .808 .067
Housing Structure (75%) .814 .066
ABBREVIATION: ICC = intraclass correlation.
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